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1 Introduction
Standard models on interregional corporate taxation predict that capital mobility
across jurisdictional borders deteriorates the ability of governments to collect corporate
tax revenues. Precisely, it is argued that jurisdictions have an incentive to lower their
tax rate in order to attract the mobile capital base which leads to a race-to-the-bottom
in corporate tax setting behavior (see Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986); Wilson (1986)).
This prediction has recently been challenged by the New Economic Geography (NEG)
literature which is based on the idea that firms benefit from locating close to other
corporations in economic and industry clusters. These agglomeration economies reduce
the interregional mobility of capital and allow agglomeration-hosting governments to
set a high corporate tax rate without triggering an immediate capital outflow even if
capital is in principle highly mobile (see Ludema and Wooton (2000), Andersson and
Forslid (2003), Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Borck and Pflu¨ger (2006)).
Empirical evidence on the relevance of this argument is however scarce at best.
Although a small set of papers suggests that the sensitivity of firm location to corporate
taxes diminishes in the presence of agglomeration economies (Devereux, Griffith, and
Simpson (2007); Bru¨lhart, Jametti, and Schmidheiny (2007); Jofre-Monseny and Sole´-
Olle´ (2008)), the literature has so far largely neglected to assess whether “policy makers
[...] effectively seek to tax agglomeration rents, and whether this [agglomeration] effect
is strong enough to have a noticeable impact on the evolution of statutory corporate
tax burdens” (Bru¨lhart, Jametti, and Schmidheiny (2007)).
Our paper contributes to close this gap and empirically tests for an impact of ag-
glomeration economies on the corporate tax rate choice. We exploit the local business
tax rate in Germany (Gewerbesteuer) as a testing ground and use a unique data set
on the population of German firms to construct detailed agglomeration measures for
German communities. Our findings largely confirm the NEG-prediction and suggest
that economic and industry agglomerations indeed exert a statistically significant and
quantitatively large impact on the local business tax choice.
The paper starts out with a simple theoretical model to receive guidance for the
specification of our empirical framework. We derive two hypotheses: Following the
reasoning of the NEG literature, the model firstly predicts that corporate urbanization
and localization economies (i.e. corporate benefits from locating close to economic
agglomerations and industry clusters respectively, see Rosenthal and Strange (2004))
raise the corporate tax rate chosen by the agglomeration-hosting jurisdiction which
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thus captures a fraction of the associated corporate agglomeration rents. Secondly,
the model shows that the jurisdictions’ ability to tax agglomeration rents critically
depends on its agglomeration characteristics relative to neighboring regions. Precisely,
if a neighboring community hosts a comparable economic agglomeration or industry
cluster, the community’s position to capture the agglomeration rents is alleviated as it
does not provide a locational benefit relative to its neighbor.1
The model predictions are tested using a data set which merges information on the
German municipalities’ local business tax to measures for economic and industry ag-
glomerations in Germany between 1999 and 2007. The agglomeration measures are
constructed based on data for the population of German firms which comprises in-
formation on the host municipality, the four-digit industry code and the number of
employees. From this data, the urbanization variable is calculated as the overall num-
ber of workers in a jurisdiction.2 To derive a localization measure, we in a first step
identify four-digit industries whose localization pattern shows strong spatial cluster-
ing in Germany following the approach proposed by Duranton and Overman (2005).
According to the concept of revealed preferences, we consider these to be the sectors
in which firms benefit from locating close to corporations in the same industry. In a
second step, we use this information to construct community-specific localization mea-
sures which account for the municipality’s number of workers in localized industries
and for the localization intensity of the industry.
Our estimation results suggest that both, urbanization economies and localization
economies, exert a positive impact on the jursidictions’ tax rate choice. The effects
are statistically significant, quantitatively large and appear across a wide range of
specifications in which we use alternative variables to capture localization economies.
Our preferred estimates suggest that doubling the overall number of employees increases
the local business tax by around 1.2% while doubling the number of employees in
localized industries raises the local business tax by around 3.4% on average.
To evaluate the impact of a jurisdiction’s relative agglomeration characteristics on
1Note that the model thus synthesizes the standard tax competition framework and its NEG modi-
fication as it suggests that jurisdictions are only able to tax agglomeration rents if their agglomeration
characteristics differ from neighboring jurisdictions. Otherwise, the race-to-the-bottom mechanism is
reintroduced despite the agglomeration features.
2Our investigation approach largely focuses on corporate rents which accrue from locating close to
other firms. In robustness checks, we however also test the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of
market-based agglomeration measures which capture the access to consumer markets. This is found
to leave our result largely unaffected.
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the local business tax choice, we moreover determine tax measures which capture a
municipality’s relative firm and industry agglomeration compared to its geographical
neighbors. In the urbanization dimension, the agglomeration measure is calculated as
the difference in the number of employees between a considered community and its
neighbors, normalized on distance. In the localization dimension, the measure analo-
gously captures employment differences for the set of localized industries hosted by
a jurisdiction compared to its neighbors. Our regression results indicate that these
relative agglomeration variables are a strong predictor of the jurisdictional local busi-
ness tax choice and explain more variation in the tax rate than the communities’ own
agglomeration characteristics.
All our regression results furthermore turn out to be robust against the inclusion of
a large set of control variables for differences in primary nature characteristics (e.g. the
quality of soil and the proximity to rivers, mountains and the sea), the communities’
demographic composition, budgetary situation and public good provision. Moreover,
our estimation approach takes into account that neighboring communities may be hit
by correlated shocks and that we might face reverse causality problems as the local
business tax rate choice may simultaneously affect firm and industry agglomeration in
a municipality. To overcome the latter identification problem, we employ an instru-
mental variable approach which relies on long-lagged historical population data and
on historical information on railway connections from the time prior to 1936 when the
first local business tax act was passed in Germany.
The paper relates to the literature on agglomeration economies. Empirical contribu-
tions in this area stress the positive role of urbanization and localization economies in
determining worker productivity (Henderson (1986), Henderson (2003) and Combes,
Duranton, Gobillon, and Roux (2007)), wages (Wheaton and Lewis (2002)) and eco-
nomic growth (Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (1992), Henderson, Kuncoro,
and Turner (1995)). Incorporating these agglomeration economies in a tax competi-
tion model predicts that agglomeration rents dampen the mobility of firms and capital
across borders which allows governments to set higher tax rates.
However, as mentioned above, the impact of agglomeration economies on the gov-
ernmental tax rate choice is empirically largely unexplored. Two exception are papers
by Bu¨ttner (2001) and Charlot and Paty (2007) who determine the effect of urbaniza-
tion economies in the consumer dimension on the tax rate choice of local jurisdictions.
Bu¨ttner (2001) analyzes the determinants of the German local business tax for munic-
ipalities in the state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and finds that jurisdictions with a larger
population tend to set higher local business tax rates. Charlot and Paty (2007) as-
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sess the effects of consumer market access on the corporate tax rate choice for French
municipalities. They find a positive relationship between the local tax rate and the
municipality’s market access suggesting the existence of a taxable agglomeration rent.
Both papers, however, neglect urbanization and localization economies in the firm di-
mension and do not account for the importance of relative agglomeration characteristics
compared to neighboring communities. Moreover, both papers do not address potential
identification problems caused by reverse causality, a problem that we circumvent in
our analysis by using an instrumental variable approach.3
Our paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the main theoretical
hypotheses underlying our empirical work. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data set and
the estimation strategy. Section 5 presents our main findings. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Simple Theoretical Model
In the following, we construct a simple theoretical model based on Haufler and Wooton
(2009) to receive guidance for the specification of our empirical framework. We con-
sider two jurisdictions i ∈ {a, b}, each inhabited by li workers. Each jurisdiction hosts
two industries, a “localized” industry and a nume´raire sector.4 Firms of the localized
industry produce a homogeneous good x under imperfect competition using labor as
variable input whereas firms in the latter sector produce the nume´raire good z under
perfect competition using labor as the only input. Contrary to the x commodity which
is traded subject to real transport (or administration costs) τ , the nume´raire good is
traded freely which also ensures the wage rate w to be equalized across jurisdictions.
Both jurisdictions compete for a fixed number of k mobile firms from a third region
which operate in the x-industry and are willing to invest in either a or b.
In the first stage, each government decides on the level of the business tax rate ti.
The location decision of the k new firms is made in the second stage. Production and
consumption occur in the last stage. We solve the game by backward induction and
begin with the third stage.
Workers’ preferences and demand
Employees in both locations derive utility from consuming both commodities x and z.
3Note that our analysis largely focuses on agglomeration economies which arise through the ge-
ographical clustering of firms. Nevertheless, our results are unaffected by the inclusion of a control
variable for the consumer market access as shown in the analysis.
4The precise characteristics of firms in the localized industry will be explained below.
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Their preferences which are identical across locations are described as
ui = αxi − β
2
x2i + zi, α, β > 0, i ∈ {a, b}. (1)
Each worker receives wage income from inelastically supplying one unit of labor to
sector x or z. Moreover, we assume that total revenues Ti stemming from local business
taxation are entirely redistributed to the workforce residing in jurisdiction i. Hence,
each worker’s budget constraint can be expressed as w + Ti
li
= zi + pixi. Solving the
representative worker’s utility maximization problem and aggregating over all workers
yields aggregate market demand Xi for good x in market i, with Xi =
li(α−pi)
β
.
Producers
Each entrant incurs fixed and identical costs f which incorporate costs e.g. for finding
a suitable location, setting up a production facility, buying sector specific machines
or administration costs not further specified in the model. These costs are sufficiently
large such that each firm operates at most one production facility. In contrast to Haufler
and Wooton (2009) we do not regard jurisdictions to be initially ‘empty’ but allow for
the existence of initial hi firms in the x industry with industry employment lix.
5 These
already existing firms have made their irreversible location decision in the past and
serve both markets from either jurisdiction a or jurisdiction b.
The sizable literature on agglomeration economies indicates various possibilities for
introducing agglomeration economies into a theoretical model.6 Early scholars like Mar-
shall (1890) or von Thu¨nen (1826) formulated different causes for industry agglomera-
tion which result from ‘thickly peopled’ industrial districts that can be subsumed under
the categories - knowledge creation and knowledge processing, sharing of intermediate
goods suppliers and sharing a common labor market. Yet in the end, these various
agglomeration channels point to the same effect: providing a single firm with a loca-
tional (cost) advantage when it locates in close proximity to other firms of the same
or other industries. As dealing with the micro-foundations of agglomeration economies
would go far beyond this paper, we decided to introduce agglomeration advantages
in the most conceivable way.7 We thereby follow a recent contribution of Konrad and
5Strictly speaking lix ≡ hi(x˜ii+ x˜ji) where x˜ii and x˜ji represent output quantities of an initial firm
that would prevail if the k firms and hence jurisdictional competition were absent. We further assume
lix < li to ensure that both commodities are produced and the wage is equalized across locations.
6Rosenthal and Strange (2004) provide a comprehensive overview of the empirical literature on the
sources of agglomeration.
7See Duranton and Puga (2004) for a detailed survey on the micro-foundations of agglomeration
economies.
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Kovenock (2009) and presume that an entrant’s set up costs f are lowered if it locates
close to these initial hi producers. For instance, new firms benefit from facilitated ac-
cess to industry specific transport or communication infrastructure when locating in a
jurisdiction with sizable economic activity.8 The fixed costs for the k new firms then
read
Fi ≡ f − γlix − µli, γ, µ > 0, i ∈ {a, b} (2)
where γlix measures a new firm’s benefit resulting from agglomerated employment at
the sectoral level (‘localization’) and µli reflects an entrant’s advantage from locating
in a jurisdiction with large overall employment (‘urbanization’). Our modeling ap-
proach thereby closely follows the empirical literature on localization and urbanization
economies where total employment in a city serves as proxy for urbanization and lo-
calization is proxied by industry employment.9 In the spirit of Brander and Krugman
(1983)’s reciprocal dumping model firms non-cooperatively choose quantities for each
market separately. Pre-tax operating profit of a firm located in i reads
pii = (pi − w)xii + (pj − w − τ)xji, i ∈ {a, b} , i 6= j (3)
where pi denotes the sales price on the own market and pj denotes the price prevailing
on the neighboring market. Note that transporting the x good to the other jurisdiction
raises marginal costs to (w + τ) whereas the marginal cost of producing the good for
the own market is simply the wage rate w. xii denotes the quantity sold on market i
and xji denotes the quantity sold on market j by a firm producing in i. Maximizing
(3) under consideration of the market demand Xi yields optimal quantities for both
markets of a firm located in i
xii =
li(α− w + (kj + hj)τ)
β(1 + k + h)
, xji =
lj(α− w − (1 + kj + hj)τ)
β(1 + k + h)
, (4)
with k = ki+kj and h = hi+hj, i 6= j, i, j ∈ {a, b}.10 Inserting (4) into the market
demand function Xi yields the equilibrium price prevailing on each market
pi =
α + (k + h)w + τ(kj + hj)
1 + k + h
, i 6= j, i, j ∈ {a, b}. (5)
8Konrad and Kovenock (2009) introduce agglomeration advantages that result from the existence
of old FDI. In particular, a jurisdiction will be more successful in attracting new FDI if it succeeded
in attracting FDI in preceding time periods as this lowers the fixed costs for new FDI.
9See e.g. early studies on agglomeration economies by Nakamura (1985) and Henderson (1986).
10As in Haufler and Wooton(2009) we assume that the cost of transporting x are positive but
sufficiently low to ensure that xji > 0 and xij > 0.
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Substituting optimal output levels using (4) and prices using (5) into (3) yields pre-tax
operating profit of a firm located in i
pii =
li[α− ω + (kj + hj)τ ]2
β(1 + k + h)2
+
lj[α− ω − (1 + kj + hj)τ ]2
β(1 + k + h)2
, i 6= j, i, j ∈ {a, b}. (6)
Locational equilibrium
At the second stage all k new firms decide on where to set up their production facility
based on the comparison of after-tax profits in a and b, with Πi ≡ pii−Fi−ti, i ∈ {a, b}.
Solving the condition for a locational equilibrium Πi − Πj = 0 yields the equilibrium
number of new firms in jurisdiction i
k∗i = −
ρ(ti − tj)
2τ 2L
+
ργ(lix − ljx)
2τ 2L
+
(φτ + ρµ)(li − lj)
2τ 2L
+
k − θ
2
, (7)
with i, j ∈ {a, b}, i 6= j, ρ ≡ β(1 + h + k) > 0 and φ ≡ 2(α − ω) − τ > 0. L = la + lb
describes the overall number of workers and θ ≡ (hi−hj) the difference in initial firms
of jurisdiction i and j. The first term in (7) incorporates the deterring effect of local
business taxation. A larger tax rate in i discourages firms from locating in this market.
The second and third term suggest that the firms’ location decision will however be less
affected by differences in tax rates if the respective jurisdiction offers some locational
advantage at the sectoral and overall level of economic activity. The equilibrium number
of firms in i will therefore be higher the larger the localized sector measured by the
number of workers in the x sector and the larger the overall number of workers relative
to the competing jurisdiction.11 Moreover, localization and urbanization advantages as
well as differences in tax rates become more important for the firms’ location choice
as transport costs decline. This is because the opportunity costs of locating in one
jurisdiction in response to differences in agglomeration economies or tax rates decline
with decreasing transport costs. Finally, allowing both locations to be non-empty at
the beginning of the tax game implies that the number of entrants in jurisdiction i will
be lower, the higher the number of existing firms in this market as competition in i
will be more intense.
Governments
In the first stage of the tax game, governments choose tax rates non-cooperatively to
maximize their residents’ wage income wli and revenues Ti = ti(hi+ki), with i ∈ {a, b}.
11We therefore account for recent empirical contributions by Devereux et al. (2007), Bru¨lhart et al.
(2007) and Jofre-Monseny and Sole´-Olle´ (2008) on the attenuating effects of agglomeration economies
on firms’ sensitivity to tax differentials.
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Differentiating each government’s objective function Wi = ti(ki+hi)+wli with respect
to its own tax rate yields
∂Wi
∂ti
= hi + ki + ti
∂ki
∂ti
= 0, i ∈ {a, b} . (8)
Using k∗i from (7), the governments’ reaction function then reads
ti =
tj
2
+
γ
2
(lix − ljx) +
(τφ+ ρµ
2ρ
)
(li − lj) + τ
2
2ρ
(h+ k)L, i ∈ {a, b} , i 6= j, (9)
with
∂ti
∂li
> 0 and
∂ti
∂lix
> 0. (10)
In the following we are interested in the effects of increased agglomeration in location i
on the government’s business tax rate choice.12 The comparative static results in (10)
suggest that both, urbanization (li) and localization (lix), exert a positive impact on
jurisdiction i’s business tax. This effect arises as firms retrieve rents from locating close
to other firms in economic and sectoral agglomerations which reduces the sensitivity of
their location choice to business tax increases. Consequently, the corporate urbanization
and localization rents become taxable for the jurisdiction’s government whose tax rate
choice thus rises in the degree of urbanization (li) and localization (lix) within its
borders.
On top of that, our model shows that the ability of a government to tax away location
rents depends on the jurisdiction’s economic and sectoral agglomeration relative to the
competing jurisdiction. This is formally captured by the comparative static results
∂t∗i
∂(li − lj) > 0,
∂t∗i
∂(lix − ljx) > 0, (11)
with i ∈ {a, b} and i 6= j. The intuition behind this finding is that the larger a juris-
diction’s economic and sectoral agglomeration relative to its neighboring jurisdiction,
the higher is its relative locational attractiveness for the set of mobile firms. Precisely,
if a jurisdiction’s agglomeration characteristics by far exceed those of its neighbor, it
is extremely unattractive for mobile firms to locate in the foreign jurisdiction. Con-
sequently, the government can set a high tax rate without triggering a firm location
12The last term in (9) results from a location-rent effect described in detail in Haufler and Wooton
(2009). The intuition behind this effect is that higher transport costs provide a shield against increased
product market competition. This allows governments to tax firms at a higher rate if transport costs
are high. We consider this effect to be of minor importance for our empirical analysis as we expect
transport costs to be low at the subnational level.
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decision against its jurisdiction. On the contrary, if the economic and sectoral agglomer-
ation characteristics of the jurisdictions are comparable such that they can be regarded
as close substitutes, each government has only limited taxing power since increases in
the business tax induce mobile firms to locate in the neighboring jurisdiction with
comparable agglomeration characteristics.
Our model can thus be considered to synthesize the standard tax competition frame-
work and its NEG modification as it suggests that jurisdictions are only able to tax
agglomeration rents if their agglomeration characteristics in the economic and sectoral
dimension are large relative to neighboring entities. If jurisdictions in contrast observe
similar agglomeration features, the race-to-the-bottom in corporate tax rates may be
reintroduced in the model despite the presence of agglomeration rents.
Summarizing, our analysis predicts a positive effect of urbanization and localization
economies on the tax rate choice and stresses that it is not only the jurisdiction’s own
agglomeration measures which are decisive for the corporate tax decision but also the
relative position compared to other jurisdictions. In the following, we will bring these
hypotheses to the data.
3 Data
Our testing ground is the German local business tax which is set autonomously by the
approximately 11,000 German municipalities. To determine how economic and industry
agglomerations affect the local business tax choice, we exploit detailed micro data on
the population of German firms to construct measures for economic agglomerations
and industry clusters.
Our final data contains information for the years 1999 to 2007. The observational
unit is the municipality per year. We restrict our analysis to communities located in
Western Germany as communities in the East German states (which joined the Federal
Republic of Germany in 1990) were subject to several structural reforms which changed
their geographical borders within our sample period.13 This leaves us with a total of
60, 646 observations for 6,776 West German municipalities between 1999 and 2007.
In the following, we will briefly describe the local business tax variable (Section 3.1),
the construction of our agglomeration measures (Section 3.2) and the control variables
included in the analysis (Section 3.3).
13Nevertheless, we find largely comparable results to the ones presented in this paper if we include
the East German municipalities in the analysis.
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3.1 The Local Business Tax Rate
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis is the local business tax rate which
is set at the municipality level and significantly contributes to the tax burden on firms
operating in Germany. The local business tax is a tax on business earnings which is
uniformly levied on all incorporated and non-incorporated firms located within the
communities’ borders. Tax discrimination between firms which operate in different
industries is not possible (see e.g. Bu¨ttner (2003) for an in-depth description of the
business tax legislation).
The information on the local business tax rate is obtained from the German Federal
Statistical Office. As reported in Table 1, the average tax rate set by the communities
in our sample is determined with 16.6% whereas the variable exhibits a considerable
spread across observations between tax rates of 0% and 25%.
3.2 Construction of the Agglomeration Measures
One major challenge for our analysis is the construction of measures that capture the
presence of economic and industry agglomerations within a municipality’s borders. To
do so, we exploit a comprehensive and detailed data set on the population of German
firms which is provided by the German Employment Agency (“Bundesagentur fu¨r Ar-
beit”) and is available for the years 1999 to 2007. The data includes information on
the firms’ industry classification at the 4-digit level, the number of employees (subject
to social security payments14) and the firms’ host community.
- Table 1 about here -
Urbanization Measures
To capture the general economic activity in a community and the associated urban-
ization rents (see Rosenthal and Strange (2004)), our analysis defines an urbanization
measure denoted by Uit. In line with previous studies, our baseline estimations approx-
imate urbanization economies by the municipality’s number of employees, formally
defined as U oit = EMPi,t with EMPi,t being the number of workers that are employed
14In Germany, only workers employed in minor contracts (earning less than 400 Euros per month)
are not subject to social security contributions.
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in municipality i at time t.15
Our discussion in Section 2 moreover suggests to construct a relative urbanization
measure that captures the community’s agglomeration size compared to neighboring
jurisdictions. Building on the idea that firms have geographical location preferences, we
define neighbors according to the inverse of their distance to the considered community
(see also Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) and Bu¨ttner (2003))16 and hence derive
a relative urbanization measure which reads
U ri,t =
J∑
j=1
(
EMPi,t − EMPj,t
DISTi,j
)
, i 6= j, (12)
whereas EMPi,t (EMPj,t) depicts the overall number of employees in the considered
jurisdiction i (neighboring jurisdictions j) in year t and DISTi,j stands for the geo-
graphic distance between the two jurisdictions.17 The higher the value of the similarity
measure U ri,t, the larger the number of workers that the considered municipality hosts
relative to neighboring jurisdictions.
Note that the construction of this relative agglomeration index is guided by our the-
oretical analysis in Section 2 which suggests that neighboring jurisdictions are location
alternatives for firms. In principle, it might also be the case that corporations (and
in consequence their host communities) benefit from firm and industry agglomerations
in neighboring municipalities. However, as previous findings in the literature suggest
that urbanization (like localization) economies have an extremely limited geographical
scope of a few kilometers at most (see Rosenthal and Strange (2004), Viladecans-Marsal
(2004), van Soest and van Oort (2006), and Jofre-Monseny (2009)), we consider the
former effect to prevail. Nevertheless, to test the sensitivity of our results, we also
recalculated the index dismissing very close neighboring communities from the index
construction which derives comparable results to the ones reported in Section 5. More-
over, our empirical analysis will account for the possibility that firms benefit from
locating close to large consumer markets (see Section 5).
Localization Measures
In a second step, we construct measures for localization economies, denoted by Li,t.
15In robustness checks, we reran the analysis using the number of firms as urbanization measure
and found comparable results.
16Precisely, this corresponds to the intuitive presumption that immediate neighbors are more likely
to be relevant competitors for firms and capital than more distant jurisdictions.
17Note that all other German communities j 6= i are considered for the construction of Uri,t whereas
their relative importance as competitors of jurisdiction i is captured by the distance normalization.
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In doing so, we acknowledge that firms may derive extra-benefits from locating close
to other corporations in the same industry. These localization economies are likely to
be sector-specific, i.e. not necessarily firms in every sector profit from locating close to
other corporations in the same industry. We thus exploit our micro data on the popu-
lation of German firms to identify 4-digit industries in Germany which exhibit strong
geographical clustering at small distances. Following the notion of revealed preferences,
we expect that those firms which belong to industries that cluster in space derive sig-
nificant benefits from locating close to corporations in the same industry.
Clustered 4-digit sectors are identified based on a methodology developed by Duran-
ton and Overman (2005) (in the following abbreviated by DO). Broadly speaking, the
DO-approach assesses whether industrial location patterns (conditional on the general
economic agglomeration) significantly deviate from randomness. The formal method-
ology is sketched in Appendix A whereas a more detailed description of the approach
as well as of the results to this exercise can be found in a companion paper (Koh and
Riedel (2009)). Abstracting from industries which are clearly not expected to show ge-
ographical localization patterns (as e.g. public libraries, retail companies etc.), the DO
approach reports that the location pattern of 78% of the remaining German manufac-
turing and service industries shows statistically significant localization at any distance.
As localization rents are plausibly only taxable if firms profit from agglomerating at
small distances within a jurisdiction’s borders18, we identify the sub-set of industries
which are significantly agglomerated within the boundaries of German jurisdictions.19
This holds for 73% of the industries included in the analysis. One merit of the DO
approach is that it also allows us to derive an index for the intensity of an industry’s
agglomeration pattern (denoted by DOm in Appendix A). For the German industries in
our sample the index varies between 0 and 0.134, with larger values indicating stronger
agglomeration patterns. Table 2 reports the list of four digit industries which are found
to be strongly localized in the sense that they exhibit a DO index above the mean of
the index distribution.
18If an industry is for example significantly agglomerated at a distance of 50 kilometers, then firms
appear to profit from being sufficiently close to each other but not necessarily from locating within
the same community. This does not allow any of our geographically small communities to tax the
associated agglomeration rent as the firms are expected to be indifferent at which precise community
within a certain distance radius to locate.
19In terms of the DO approach, these industries are agglomerated at a distance of 0 kilometers as
we cannot identify the exact geographic location of firms within one community and the geographical
distance of firms located in the same community is consequently determined with zero kilometers.
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From this information, we define a localization variable which comprises the commu-
nity’s number of workers employed in localized industries Lo1i,t =
∑M
m=1 EMPi,m,t with
EMPi,m,t indicating the number of employees in community i at time t in the localized
industry m.
Moreover, following the idea of revealed preferences, the corporate agglomeration
benefits are expected to be larger the stronger the observed localization pattern in
an industry. This suggests to construct localization measures which link information
on the number of employees in a localized industry with information on the indus-
try’s localization pattern. To do so, we follow two approaches. Firstly, we construct
a variable which recalculates Lo1i,t accounting only for strongly localized industries
with a DO index above the mean of the distribution. Secondly, we define a variable
Lo2i,t =
∑M
m=1EMPi,m,t ·DOm which multiplicatively links the number of localized em-
ployees and the localization intensity of the industry. The latter reflects an intuitive
complementary relation between the two measures, with increases in the number of em-
ployees exerting a stronger effect on the tax rate choice the larger the agglomeration
intensity, and vice versa.
Following our theoretical predictions, we moreover determine a localization mea-
sure for the community’s industry agglomeration relative to neighboring jurisdictions.
Precisely, we define the variable Lri,t as the difference of a jurisdiction’s number of em-
ployees in a localized industry compared to its neighbors. Summing up over all localized
industries reads
Lri,t =
J∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
(
EMPi,m,t − EMPj,m,t
DISTi,j
)
, i 6= j (13)
whereas EMPi,m,t (EMPj,m,t) again depicts jurisdiction i’s (the neighboring jurisdic-
tion j’s) number of employees in industry m at year t and DISTi,j stands for the
distance between the two jurisdictions. The higher this measure, the larger are the
localization characteristics of the considered community compared to its geographical
neighbors. Again, we additionally account for the agglomeration intensity of the local-
ized industry by recalculating the relative agglomeration measure Lri,t for the subgroup
of strongly localized industries with a DO index above the mean of the distribution.
As the distribution of the urbanization and localization measures is strongly skewed,
our empirical analysis employs a logarithmic transformation of the variables. To avoid
losing observations with non-positive values, we follow previous studies (e.g. Alesina,
Barro, and Tenreyro (2002)) and define the logarithm of the distance to the variable’s
minimum value plus a small constant. Formally, log U rit is thus defined as logU
r
it =
14
log[U rit + min(U
r
it) + η], with η being a small positive constant. Analogous logarithmic
transformations are employed for Lo1it , L
o2
it and L
r
it.
- Table 2 about here -
Descriptive statistics for the defined localization and urbanization measures are de-
picted in Table 1. All variables exhibit a considerable variation across observations.
Moreover, as indicated in Table 3, the constructed agglomeration measures are posi-
tively correlated (with correlation coefficients between 0.498 and 0.831). Table 3 more-
over points to a positive correlation between the agglomeration measures and the local
business tax choice. In the following section, we will assess whether this pattern prevails
in an in-depth econometric analysis.
3.3 Control Variables
Last, we augment our data by information on various municipality characteristics which
are used as control variables in our analysis. Precisely, we include variables for first-
order nature differences between the jurisdictions, comprising data for the soil quality
(precisely, categorial data on the fertility, erosion and slope of the soil, published in
the European Soil Database) and the location of a community at rivers, lakes, the sea
and the mountains (obtained from the Bundesamt fu¨r Kartographie und Geoda¨sie).20
- Table 3 about here -
Moreover, we account for information on the inhabitants’ average net income and the
community’s financial situation as measured by the deficit per capita and the grants
per capita received through the German income redistribution scheme. Furthermore,
we add information on the level of public good provision by including variables on
infrastructure quality, precisely the number of railway stations, airports, seaports and
high-way connections. We moreover include information on public good preferences
20As the data on soil fertility and erosion is available in categorial format, we add a full set of dummy
variables for the categories to our analysis. Analogously, the information on the geographical location
of communities at rivers, lakes, the sea and mountains is captured by a set of dummy variables. To
save on space, the descriptive statistics for the nature geographics are not reported in the paper but
are available from the authors upon request.
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and financing needs as indicated by the fraction of the community’s population aged
below 14 and above 65, the unemployment rate and (in robustness checks) the political
party of the municipality’s mayor. As the majority of control variables is available
for a subset of sample years only, including them in the analysis reduces the sample
size. Last, a distance-weighted average local business tax rate for the municipality’s
neighboring communities is added.21 All variables show a considerable variation across
communities. The associated descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.
4 Empirical Methodology
In our empirical analysis, we estimate a model of the following form
tit = α0 + α1 logUit + α2 logLit + α3Xit + it (14)
whereas tit depicts the local business tax rate of community i at time t. Uit and Lit stand
for the urbanization and localization measures defined in the previous section. Our
theoretical model predicts that firm and industry agglomerations within a jurisdiction’s
borders exert a positive effect on the community’s tax rate choice. Consequently, we
presume α1, α2 > 0.
Moreover, we include a vector of control variables Xit. As indicated in the previous
section, we account for first order differences in nature characteristics by including
information on the soil quality and geographic landscape. This takes care of the fact
that nature geographics may have historically determined the settlement of people and
firms (and thus the emergence of economic agglomerations) but may simultaneously
exert a direct effect on today’s tax setting behaviour as governments have an incen-
tive to tax rents related to characteristics of immobile land. Additionally, we include
a set of control variables for public good provision and preferences (e.g. the number
of railway stations, highway connections, the demographic composition) and the com-
munity’s financial situation (e.g. the per capita deficit and per capita grants received)
which may affect the community’s tax rate choice. Furthermore, the distance-weighted
average local business tax rate of neighboring communities is added to capture the
responsiveness to the tax setting behavior of neighbors. To account for adjustment lags
in the policy responses, all control variables enter as first lags. Moreover, we include
21The information on inhabitant net income, the communities’ budget and demographic variables
is retrieved from the German Federal Statistical office and its publication Statistik Lokal. Information
on the infrastructure variables is obtained from the Bundesamt fu¨r Kartographie und Geoda¨sie.
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a full set of year fixed effects to capture common shocks over time as well as a full
set of fixed effects for 74 employment regions in West Germany defined according to
German commuting patterns (“Raumordnungsregionen”, see Bundesamt fu¨r Bauwesen
und Raumordung).
The latter absorb differences between German commuting areas and imply that iden-
tification is achieved through cross-sectional variation within the employment regions.
Note that adding jurisdictional fixed effects is not feasible in this framework as our ag-
glomeration measures exhibit a shallow time variation only (confirming previous studies
which suggest that geographic clusters are time-persistent, see e.g. Duranton and Over-
man (2005)). Instead of running cross-sectional regressions for every year, we choose
the more efficient approach of pooling the observations and adjusting the standard
errors such that they are robust to dependency in the error terms over time. This also
yields unbiased estimates in the presence of unobservable municipality-specific random
effects. The results presented in the following section moreover account for clustering
at the level of the employment region and hence allow for common shocks to munici-
palities within the same employment area (whereas we derive comparable results if we
cluster at the community level).
Furthermore, we correct the estimation described in equation (14) for a potential
reverse causality bias. A large literature reports that corporate taxes exert a signifi-
cantly negative effect on economic investment and firm location (for recent surveys, see
de Mooij and Ederveen (2003) and Devereux (2007); for evidence on investment dis-
tortions of the German local business tax, see Becker, Egger, and Merlo (2008)). This
suggests that OLS estimates are biased downwards and the true effect of agglomeration
economies on the corporate tax rate choice is underestimated in OLS frameworks. To
account for reverse causality, we employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach and
construct a set of instruments Zi for community i which are correlated with the agglom-
eration measures but are exogeneous to the error term it. Formally, Cov(Ui, Zi) 6= 0,
Cov(Li, Zi) 6= 0 and Cov(Zi, i) = 0. To test whether the instruments are correlated
with the agglomeration measures, our first-stage estimation results will report the par-
tial R-squared and F-test for the set of excluded instruments and a Stock-Yogo test
for weak identification. Moreover, we are in the position to construct more instrumen-
tal variables than needed to identify the estimation system and thus, we employ a
Sargan-Hansen overidentification test to determine whether the exogeneity assumption
is fulfilled. The results are presented in Section 5.22
22Note that we consider our set of control variables to largely absorb systematic heterogeneity
which may simultaneously drive agglomeration measures and the local business tax choice. However,
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Our set of instrumental variables Zi comprises long-lagged information on population
and infrastructure measures. To ensure that the agglomeration measures are unaffected
by the local business tax, we use information before the introduction of the first local
business Tax Act (’Reichsgewerbesteuergesetz vom 1. Dezember 1936’) in Germany in
1936. Our first set of instruments is constructed from a population census in 1910.23
Although the population information is available for all communities in 1910, we have
to address the problem that several jurisdictions have experienced adjustments in their
jurisdictional borders since then. Precisely, in 1910 the area which is Germany today has
hosted around 80,000 autonomous communities. Today the same area is divided into
around 11,000 communities only. Using historical maps, we have linked the population
data in 1910 to today’s jurisdiction borders and thus constructed information on the
long lagged population of today’s municipalities.24 The final matching rate to current
West German municipalities amounts to 97 %. Note moreover that although long-lagged
population data has been employed in other contexts to instrument for agglomeration
economies (see e.g. Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, and
Roux (2007)), our data is in many respects superior to these studies since we obtain
long-lagged information for the whole territory of the German state in 1910 and do not
have to restrict our analysis to jurisdictions (commonly cities) above a size threshold
like earlier work.
Based on this long-lagged population information, we construct several instruments
for our agglomeration measures. First, we include the long-lagged population size and
population density respectively since agglomerations are perceived to be persistent
over time and long-lagged size information is thus expected to be a strong determi-
nant of today’s agglomeration patterns. However, the access to consumer markets and
the relative size compared to neighboring jurisdictions may have equally affected ag-
glomeration dynamics in the last century and thus, we also construct the long-lagged
market potential of the community (defined as the sum of inhabitants in neighboring
communities normalized on geographic distance, analogously to the market potential
definition in previous studies, see e.g. Charlot and Paty (2007)) and a long-lagged
as reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity problems result in the same source of estimation
bias (a correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term), our instrumental variable
approach may also be considered to take care of remaining unobserved heterogeneity.
23Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt (1915), Die Volksza¨hlung im Deutschen Reiche am 1. Dezember
1910, Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Berlin.
24Fortunately, names of historic municipalities did merely change over time and they could be
precisely located as the data set was partitioned into single provinces which simplified the matching.
18
relative population size measure which is defined analogously to U ri,t.
Moreover, as a second set of instruments we include long-lagged information on the
number of train connections which run through a considered municipality. The data
is obtained from Handbuch der deutschen Eisenbahnstrecken and includes information
on all train connections in Germany between the 1835 and 1935.25 We match the long-
lagged information on the railway system to the communities in our data set based
on historic maps. Although past infrastructure investments are themselves driven by
determinants at the time of construction (like e.g. population density and natural re-
sources), they are equally perceived to impact on location decisions and agglomeration
dynamics after their construction.26 The long-lagged information on the German rail-
way system may thereby serve as a particularly good instrument for the localization of
industries since in Germany particularly manufacturing firms with comparably large
transport costs tend to be localized for which the connection to the railway system
may be of particular interest. From this long-lagged railway information, we define two
instruments: first, the number of train connections which ran through a municipality
between 1835 and 1935 and the train network in neighboring communities between
1835 and 1935 (the latter being defined as the sum of train connections which ran
through neighboring communities normalized on distance).27
25Handbuch der deutschen Eisenbahnstrecken (1984): Ero¨ffnungsdaten 1835-1935, Streckenla¨ngen,
Konzessionen, Eigentumsverha¨ltnisse, Dumjahn, Mainz.
26This is, for example, also accounted for in a related framework by Redding, Sturm, and Wolf (2007)
who show that the division of Germany into two states after World War II triggered a relocation of
the airport hub from Berlin to Frankfurt (Main) which did not relocate back to Berlin after the
reunification of Germany in 1990. This suggests that past infra-structure investments may prevail and
may equally determine today’s location patterns.
27Analogously to the definition of our agglomeration measures, we consider all other municipalities
in Germany to be neighbors to a considered community whereas the distance normalization ensures
that geographically close neighbors receive larger weights in the calculation. Note moreover that we
only obtain information on train connections which were opened before 1935. The closure of train
connections between 1835 and 1935 is not accounted for. Nevertheless, we expect the instrument to
capture the infrastructure connection of a community during the considered time period. In cases in
which train connections were abolished before 1935, additional noise is introduced which lowers the
relevance of the instrument.
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5 Results
Our results are depicted in Tables 4A-6. All regressions control for a full set of year fixed
effects and a full set of fixed effects for German employment regions. Heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors allowing for clustering at the level of the employment regions
are presented in parentheses.
5.1 Effect of Own Agglomeration Characteristics
In Specifications (1)-(5) of Table 4A, we regress the municipalities’ local business tax
rate on an urbanization measure comprising the jurisdiction’s number of employees
(log U oi,t) and a localization measure comprising the number of employees in localized
industries (log Lo1i,t).
28 Controlling for a full set of commuting area fixed effects and year
fixed effects, the coefficient estimates in Specification (1) suggest that both urbanization
and localization economies exert a positive and statistically significant effect on the
local business tax choice. Quantitatively, the regressions indicate that doubling the
overall number of employees in the community raises the local business tax by 0.131
percentage points while doubling the number of localized employees raises the local
business tax by 0.056 points. Evaluated at the sample mean of 16.6%, this corresponds
to rise of the local business tax by 0.8% and 0.3%.
- Table 4A about here -
In Column (2), we reestimate the baseline specification additionally controlling for
geographical characteristics and soil quality. Precisely, we add indicators relating to the
fertility, erosion and slope of the soil and the geographical proximity of the community
to rivers, mountains, the sea and lakes which turns out to leave both the urbanization
and the localization effects qualitatively and quantitatively unaffected. Following a set
of previous studies (see e.g. Bu¨ttner (2003)), Specification (3) moreover includes the
lagged distance-weighted average local business tax rate of neighboring communities
into the analysis to account for tax competition behavior between the municipalities.
28The results for the Lo1i,t and L
o2
i,t measures presented in this section account for localized industries
if the considered community hosts at least 0.5% of the localized industry’s employees. This accounts
for the fact that a critical industry fraction is likely to be required for localization economies to arise.
Choosing a lower minimum threshold share derives similar results although the coefficient estimates
for the localization measure tend to be somewhat smaller.
20
While the neighboring tax rate enters positively as expected, the coefficient estimates
for the urbanization and localization measures remain statistically significant and quan-
titatively unchanged.
- Table 4B about here -
Apart from that, a community’s tax rate choice may also be determined by its finan-
cial situation and spending needs. To account for that, Specification (4) additionally
controls for the community type (by adding dummy variables indicating rural com-
munities, border communities and state capitals), for the lagged per capita income
level of the community’s inhabitants as well as for the lagged financial deficit and the
lagged administration and investment grants received from the federal and state gov-
ernments. The coefficient estimates for the agglomeration measures are quantitatively
smaller than in the previous specifications but keep their statistical significance. Includ-
ing control variables for the demographic structure (the lagged population share aged
above 65, the lagged population share aged below 14 and the lagged unemployment
rate) and the infrastructure (the high way access, number of railway stations, number
of airports and number of seaports) in a community further dampens the effect of the
urbanization and localization measure on the local business tax rate which remains
statistically significant though.29
29In robustness checks, we moreover included control variables for the political sphere (precisely
the party affiliation of the major and the largest party in the city/community council) which are
unfortunately available for a subset of German states only and hence drastically reduce the sample
size. The inclusion of these controls does not alter our qualitative or quantitative regression results.
Note moreover, that the control variables exhibit the expected signs. The coefficient estimate for the
average neighbor tax enters positively (although insignificant in some specifications). As expected, the
community’s tax rate choice moreover rises in its lagged deficit, reflecting a larger financing need. The
sign of the coefficient estimates for the grant measures is a priori ambiguous since larger grants on
the one hand may relax the community’s financing need but widely-used matching grant schemes may
on the other hand equally raise the community’s fundings needs. Our results suggest that the latter
effect tends to prevail. Moreover, in line with intuition, the estimates suggest that rural communities
tend to set lower business tax rates (corresponding to lower funding needs) and a high infrastructure
provision (coefficient estimates are not reported in the paper) equally enhances the local business
tax choice. Additionally, we find that communities with a large fraction of the population being aged
above 65 or being unemployed tend to charge a larger local business tax rate which can be explained
by larger spending needs as German municipalities are in charge of providing a relevant fraction of
social assistance. Last, the per capita income variable enters negatively, although insignificant, which
may firstly, reflect that inhabitants with high income levels are less likely to rely on social assistance
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However, we expect the size of the localization economies not only to depend on the
number of firms in localized industries but also on the industries’ localization intensity.
Hence, we additionally run regressions which account for the industries’ tendency to
cluster in space as determined by the DO index and reestimate our baseline regressions
with a localization measures Lo1it that comprises strongly localized industries only (with
a DO index above the mean of the index distribution). The findings confirm the positive
effect of urbanization and localization rents on the local business tax choice whereas,
in line with intuition, the localization effect increases in size compared to the base-
line specifications (the results are not reported in the paper to save on space). Table
4A depicts specifications including the localization variable Lo2it which multiplicatively
links the number of employees in a localized industry and the localization intensity as
measured by the DO index. The results are reported in Columns (6) to (8) and again
confirm our previous qualitative findings, in the sense that both, the localization and
the urbanization measure exert a positive and statistically significant impact on the
jurisdiction’s corporate tax rate choice. Larger adjusted R-squared values moreover in-
dicate that the new localization variable explains more variation in the local business
tax rate across communities than the localization variable in the baseline regressions.
Quantitatively, the estimates suggest that doubling the number of total and localized
employees in a community respectively, raises the local business tax rate by 0.069 and
0.308 percentage points. Evaluated at the mean local business tax rate of 16.6%, this
corresponds to a rise of 0.4% and 1.9%.30
The regression analysis has so far relied on standard OLS methodology. As described
in Section 4, OLS estimates are however biased in the presence of reverse causality.
Since a comprehensive literature finds evidence for a negative and sizable corporate
tax effect on asset investment and firm location (see e.g. Devereux (2007)), we expect
our OLS results to be distorted downwards. Following our argumentation in Section 4,
we consequently employ an IV approach using long-lagged information on the commu-
nity’s population and train connections as instruments for our agglomeration measures.
but may secondly, also be driven by that fact that the German communities are entitled to a fraction
of the inhabitants lagged income tax payments which may correlate with today’s income.
30The interpretation of the coefficient estimate for the localization measure remains the same as in
the baseline specification. To see this, note that Lo2it =
∑
mDOm ×EMPi,m,t can be rewritten Lo2it =∑
mEMPi,m,t ·
∑
mDOm×λi,m,t = Lo1it ·
∑
mDOm×λi,m,t, with λi,m,t = EMPi,m,t/
∑
mEMPi,m,t
being the share of localized industry m’s employment relative to all employees in localized industries
within the community. Assuming
∑
mDOm×λi,m,t to be unaffected by changes in the overall number
of localized employees
∑
mEMPi,m,t = L
o1
it , the first derivative of equation (14) with respect to L
o1
it
is ∂tit/∂L
o1
it = α2 · 1Lo2it ·
∑
mDOm × λi,m,t = α2 · 1Lo1it .
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Since the overall number of employees U oit and the number of employees in localized
industries Lo1it are highly correlated (see Table 3), finding relevant and separate instru-
ments for both agglomeration measures is fraught with difficulty. Nevertheless, as the
correlation is substantially smaller between the urbanization measure U oit and the more
sophisticated agglomeration measure Lo2it , the latter allows for a separate identification
of the effects in the IV approach.
The results are presented in Specifications (9) to (11) of Table 4A. The specifi-
cations account for endogeneity of the localization and urbanization variable by in-
strumenting with long-lagged information on the community’s population and railway
connections. Following previous studies, we moreover account for potential endogeneity
of the distance-weighted average tax rate of neighboring communities (see Hines and
Rice (1994)).31 The results confirm the positive effect of urbanization and localization
economies on the corporate tax rate choice whereas the coefficient estimates are, as
expected, larger than in the OLS regressions. The increase in the coefficient estimate
is moreover less pronounced for the localization measure which is in line with intu-
ition as firms in localized industries are expected to retrieve higher location rents than
firms in non-localized sectors. They are hence expected to react less responsive to tax
rate changes which dampens potential reverse causality problems in our framework.
Specification (11) suggests that doubling the number of total and localized employees
raises the local business tax rate by 0.197 and 0.564 percentage points respectively or
(evaluated at the sample mean) by 1.2% and 3.4%.
Note moreover, that our instrument set is found to be relevant and valid. To assess
the relevance of the instruments, Table 4B reports the first stage regression results.
Columns (1) and (2) depict the first stage for the urbanization and localization measures
U oit and L
o2
it in Specification (11) of Table 4A. As predicted, both the long-lagged pop-
ulation variables and the long-lagged railway information tend to exert a positive and
significant effect on the agglomeration variables. The partial R-squared of the excluded
instrument set and the F-tests for the exclusion restrictions suggest the instruments
to be relevant. Moreover, the quantitative impact of the instruments differs between
localization and urbanization measures. Specifically, while the long-lagged population
density and the long-lagged market potential tend to exert a quantitatively strong im-
pact on the urbanization measure, the localization variable is strongly determined by
the long-lagged railway connections, both in the considered and in neighboring com-
munities, and by the relative long lagged population size compared to neighboring
31Following Hines and Rice (1994), we moreover add the distance-weighted average population size
of the neighbors as an additional instrument to our IV set.
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jurisdictions. This suggests that we do not face a weak instrument problem which is
confirmed by the Stock-Yogo test reported in Table 4A.
Moreover, for the instrumental variables approach to be valid, the instruments must
be exogeneous to the error term. The long-lagged nature of our IVs strongly suggests
exogeneity whereas it has to be ensured that the instruments do not impact on the juris-
dictional tax rate choice through any other channel than the agglomeration measures.
Precisely, one may think about differences in nature characteristics which may in prin-
ciple drive both long-lagged agglomeration characteristics and today’s local business
tax choice. However, as all specifications control for a large set of nature geographics,
we consider this to be very unlikely. The exogeneity of the instrument set is confirmed
in all instrumental variable specifications by a Sargan-Hansen overidentification test
reported in Table 4A.
5.2 Effect of Relative Agglomeration Characteristics
Additionally, we follow our theoretical model and assess whether a municipality’s tax
setting behavior is affected by its relative agglomeration characteristics compared to
neighboring jurisdictions. Hence, we regress the local business tax on the jurisdiction’s
relative urbanization compared to neighboring jurisdictions (log U ri,t) and its relative
localization compared to neighboring jurisdictions (log Lri,t).
The results are presented in Table 5A. Specifications (1) to (3) employ a relative
localization variable which accounts for all localized industries. The results suggest that
both, the relative urbanization and localization measure, exert a positive and significant
impact on the local business tax choice which turns out to be robust against the
inclusion of the set of control variables described in the previous section. Interestingly,
the relative agglomeration measures explain a larger fraction of the local business tax
variation than the own agglomeration characteristics as indicated by the adjusted R-
squared statistics (0.6407 in Column (5) of Table 4A versus 0.6531 in Column (3)).
- Table 5A about here -
Similar results are found if we reestimate the regressions employing the relative lo-
calization measure which accounts for strongly localized industries (with a DO-index
above the mean) only in Specifications (4) to (6). In line with intuition, the coefficient
estimates for the localization variable and the adjusted R-squared statistic increase in
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the latter specifications (as larger localization intensities are presumed to be associ-
ated with higher agglomeration rents). Moreover, running a specification with both,
the community’s own and relative agglomeration characteristics (as measured by the
variables log U oi,t/log L
o2
i,t and log U
r
i,t/log L
r
i,t respectively) underpins the importance
of the relative measures in explaining the jurisdictional tax rate choice. Precisely, in
Specification (7), the coefficient estimates for the own agglomeration characteristics
become insignificant while the coefficient estimates for the relative agglomeration char-
acteristics remain qualitatively and quantitatively unaltered.
Moreover, we again account for a potential reverse causality bias as the relative
agglomeration measures may be determined by tax policy choices (although less so
than the own agglomeration measures in the baseline analysis). Thus, we reestimate
Specifications (5) and (6) in an IV framework. The results are reported in Specifications
(8) and (9) and confirm the positive impact of urbanization and localization on the tax
rate choice. The first stage regressions in Table 5B and the Stock-Yogo test suggest
our instruments to be relevant and the Sargan/Hansen overidentification test does not
reject the null hypothesis that the IV set is exogeneous to the error term. Moreover,
in line with our reverse causality presumption, both quantitative agglomeration effects
are found to increase in the IV specifications.
- Table 5B about here -
Note that one advantage of using the relative agglomeration measures is that they
absorb potential correlations of the degree of urbanization with a community’s public
good preferences or public good provision costs which may equally affect the local busi-
ness tax choice.32 While we account for these heterogeneity dimensions by including a
large set of control variables in our baseline specifications, this problem is absent by
construction for the relative agglomeration variables. To see this, consider the example
of the agglomerations of Frankfurt(Main) and Dusseldorf. Both cities are large which
may affect their fiscal needs. However, while Frankfurt is the only large metropolitan
city in central Germany, Dusseldorf is surrounded by a set of other large cities in the
Ruhr area. Thus, Frankfurt, in contrast to Dusseldorf, tends to be large in relative
32The sign of this correlation is unclear though. On the one hand, public spending preferences, for
example for cultural goods, may increase in community size and enhance the fiscal need which might
exert a positive effect on the local business tax. On the other hand, the population size of a community
may imply economies of scale in providing public goods which tends to dampen the fiscal need and
henceforth the local business tax.
25
terms. Put differently, Frankfurt belongs to the treatment group of the analysis while
Dusseldorf is part of the control group. Precisely, both, the urbanization and the local-
ization index, are about twice as large as for the city of Frankfurt than for the city of
Dusseldorf and hence, Specification (9) suggests Frankfurt to set a by 0.32 percentage
points larger local business tax rate for relative urbanization reasons and a by around
0.38 percentage points larger local business tax for relative localization reasons.33
Concluding, our analysis thus suggests that both urbanization and localization
economies exert a positive impact on the local business tax and that especially com-
munities with large agglomeration characteristics relative to their neighboring munici-
palities tend to choose large business tax rates.
5.3 Robustness Checks and Discussion
In robustness checks, we also experimented with alternative agglomeration measures
to the ones reported in the previous section. We for example constructed a local-
ization variable which additionally accounts for the share of the localized industry
that is hosted by the considered community as a larger industry fraction may be ex-
pected to increase the localization rents retrieved by corporations. Precisely, we define
Lo3it =
∑M
m=1 EMPi,m,t · DOm · si,m,t with si,m,t = EMPi,m,t/
∑
iEMPm,i,t depicting
community i’s employment share of the localized industry m at time t. The measure
again presupposes a complementary relationship between EMPi,m,t, DOm and si,m,t.
Consequently, increases in the number of localized employees are assumed to exert a
stronger impact on the tax rate, the larger the industry share hosted by the municipal-
ity and the larger the localization intensity of the industry. The results are presented
in Specifications (1) and (2) of Table 6. Column (1) depicts a OLS specification with
a full set of control variables. While the coefficient estimates confirm the positive ef-
fect of both, urbanization and localization economies, on the local tax rate choice, the
quantitative effect of the localization measure and the adjusted R-squared turn out to
be lower than in our baseline regressions (with an adjusted R-squared of 0.6425 vs.
0.6448 in our baseline specifications (see Column (8) of Table 4A)) which suggests that
the fit of the specifications is inferior to our baseline regressions. The IV regression in
Column (2) confirms this finding.
In a second step, we moreover assess the sensitivity of the relative agglomeration
effect to alternative variable definitions. Precisely, we construct a relative localization
33The actual difference in the local business tax rates set by Frankfurt(Main) and Dusseldorf is
around 1.6 percentage points.
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measure for communities that host clusters of localized industries. For these localization
centers, the measure captures the average geographical distance to other clusters in
the same localized industry. We presume that the larger the average distance to other
centers, the smaller the competitive pressure on the community and the larger its
ability to tax the accruing localization rents. Formally, we define the measure Lr2i,t =∑M
m=1
∑J
j=1
DISTi,j
J
if si,m,t, sj,m,t > α, with i 6= j. DISTi,j depicts the distance between
the considered community i and the neighboring jurisdiction j if both municipalities
host a minimum employment share si,m,t,sj,m,t> α in the localized industry m at time t.
The index construction assumes α = 0.5% and accounts for strongly localized industries
(with a DO index above the mean) only whereas neither assumption is decisive for our
qualitative findings. The results are reported in Columns (3) and (4) and indicate that
the community’s tax rate choice indeed increases in the distance to other localized
industry centers. This confirms the notion that the relative localization compared to
geographical neighbors exerts a positive impact on the local business tax choice.34
- Table 6 about here -
Additionally, our analysis has so far largely focused on agglomeration effects which
arise due to firm clustering in space. Nevertheless, in the presence of trade costs, the
corporate location decision is also expected to be affected by the distance to consumer
markets. Thus, we run robustness checks on all our specifications, including a variable
for a community’s market potential. Following previous studies (see e.g. Charlot and
Paty (2007)), we thereby define market potential as the market access to neighboring
municipalities (formally, the total net household income in a neighboring jurisdiction
normalized on distance, summed up over all German municipalities35). We find our
results to be largely unaffected by this modification. Specifications (5) and (6) of Table
6 present the reestimation of the regressions in Columns (8) and (11) in Table 4A.
The specifications show that including the market potential as a control variable leaves
our agglomeration results qualitatively and quantitatively unaltered. Note moreover
that the coefficient estimate for the market potential variable does not gain statistical
significance. Although this runs counter to our expectation, the finding is in line with
34Reverse causality is not considered to play a relevant role with respect to the distance to other
industry centers. Nevertheless, IV regressions for the latter localization measure show similar results
(not reported in the paper).
35Following our previous argumentation, we again take the logarithm of the market potential mea-
sure to avoid results driven by outliers in the distribution.
27
previous results in the literature which e.g. report ambiguous effects of market access
on direct investments (see e.g. Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, and Naughton (2007)).
Furthermore, it has been stressed in the literature that firms may benefit from lo-
cating in a community with a diverse industry structure as the diversity of economic
environments may favor the productivity of firms through the cross-fertilization of
ideas as described in Jacobs (1969). Hence, we additionally assess the robustness of
our results to the inclusion of a measure for the community’s industry diversification.
A common variable used in the literature is the inverse Hirschman-Herfindahl index
(see also Duranton and Puga (2000)). It is defined as the inverse of a municipality’s
sum of squared industry employment shares. A higher index indicates a more diver-
sified municipality which holds employment shares across many different industries.
The results are reported in Specifications (7) and (8) of Table 6. The OLS estimate
in Specification (7) shows that diversification in the industry structure, as expected,
exerts a positive impact on a jurisdiction’s tax rate choice and leaves the coefficient
estimates for our agglomeration measures largely unaffected. Instrumenting for the di-
versity index and the firm agglomeration measures in Specification (8) renders our IV
approach invalid though as the Stock Yogo test indicates weak identification. This is
in line with intuition since municipalities which comprise urbanization advantages in
general also tend to host a large variety of different industries and the urbanization
and diversification measures are thus highly correlated.
Moreover, our analysis so far accounted for localization variables which were con-
structed based on the DO methodology. As described in Appendix A and a companion
paper (Koh and Riedel (2009)), we consider the DO approach to be superior to other
approaches for the identification of industry localization patterns, including a widely-
used methodology developed by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) (henceforth EG). Never-
theless, as a sensitivity check, we reconstructed our localization measures on the basis
of the EG approach. In principle, the EG procedure identifies a comparable (although
not identical) set of four-digit industries to be significantly localized. Methodology and
findings are described in detail in Koh and Riedel (2009). Note that the EG approach
also allows to derive an index for the localization intensity of an industry which we
use for the construction of the agglomeration measures in an analogous way to the
DO index in our main analysis. In general, using localization measures based on the
EG approach confirms our previous findings (not reported in the paper). Nevertheless,
the impact of the EG-measures on the local business tax choice is found to be quan-
titatively weaker which is in line with the EG index being a less precise measure for
industry localization.
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Last, several papers suggest that firms are more productive in economic and indus-
try agglomerations. However, the source of this productivity advantage may principally
root either in agglomeration economies or in the fact that more productive firms might
select into urbanized areas. If the latter applies and firms face positive relocation costs,
communities may exploit that firms are locked within their borders and set a positive
tax rate which rises in the firm’s productivity and hence, profitability. Nevertheless,
previous empirical papers suggest that it is mostly agglomeration effects which drive
the productivity advantage of firms in urbanized areas (see Combes, Duranton, Gobil-
lon, Puga, and Roux (2009)) and thus, we are confident that the interpretation of our
results as agglomeration effects is valid. Along the same lines, we check the underly-
ing profitability determinants between the set of localized industries and non-localized
industries in our study.36 The literature suggest that it is mainly market concentra-
tion and specific investments which drive industry-productivity. Hence, as a robustness
check we exclude those industries from the calculation of our localization measure
which exhibit above average market power for a small number of firms (determined
by a Herfindahl-Index) and are characterized by above average investments in research
and development (R&D).37 The results (not reported in the paper) indicate that the
coefficient estimates remain largely unaffected by the modification in the definition of
the localization variable which again suggests that interpreting the effects determined
in this paper as agglomeration forces is valid.
6 Conclusion
This paper assesses whether policy makers take agglomeration rents into account when
choosing their corporate tax rate. Employing unique data which merges local business
tax rates set by German municipalities to information on agglomeration characteristics,
we show that hosting firm clusters exerts a positive effect on the municipalities’ tax
setting behaviour. In doing so, we distinguish between general economic agglomera-
36If firms in localized industries are more profitable than firms in non-localized industries, the fact
that jurisdictions choose to tax the former at a larger rate may be driven by positive relocation costs
and the jurisdiction’s incentive to tax larger rents at a higher rate. Note however that the literature
has not brought forward an argument why more productive industries should have a larger incentive
to exhibit agglomeration patterns.
37This modification, for example, implies that financial industries which belong to the group of
localized sectors according to our DO approach, are dropped from the calculation of the localization
measure.
29
tions (which give rise to urbanization economies) and industry clusters (which give rise
to localization economies) and provide evidence that both tend to exert a positive and
large effect on the local business tax choice. Our preferred estimates suggest that dou-
bling the community’s overall number of employees increases the local business tax by
1.2% on average while doubling the number of employees in localized sectors increases
the local business tax rate by 3.4% on average.
Moreover, our analysis indicates that a jurisdiction’s ability to tax away agglomera-
tion rents depends on the relative size of its firm and industry agglomerations compared
to neighboring communities. Thus, we find that it is those jurisdictions which host large
economic agglomerations relative to neighboring jurisdictions that tend to choose high
local business taxes. The same effect arises if jurisdictions host firm clusters in indus-
tries that are not (well) represented in municipalities closeby. In other words, it pays for
jurisdictions to have an industry structure which is differentiated from their neighbors
as the differentiation allows them to escape from corporate tax competition and to set
a higher corporate tax rate.
Thus, our analysis confirms the prediction of the New Economic Geography literature
which suggests that agglomeration rents are taxable to the community. Our paper
however also offers a qualification of the argument in the sense that we tend to find
agglomeration rents to be taxable only if the jurisdiction observes large agglomeration
characteristics relative to neighboring communities. If neighboring communities are
close substitutes instead, the race-to-the-bottom in corporate tax rates is reintroduced
despite the presence of agglomeration rents.
From a policy perspective, our paper contributes to explaining why corporate tax
rates at the local level remained relatively stable over the last decades despite an
increasing interregional capital mobility. Moreover, the findings have implications for
the design of regional economic policies that foster the development of new industry
clusters. If one aim of regional policy is, for example, to strengthen the municipalities’
revenue potential, our analysis suggests that the policy measures should allow for a
differentiation in the economic and industry structure of neighboring communities in
order to ensure that they are in the position to tax accruing agglomeration rents.
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Appendix A: Identifying Agglomerated Industries
The literature has proposed various approaches to identify the geographical location pattern
of an industry. The most widely used methodologies have been developed by Ellison and
Glaeser (1997) (henceforth EG) and Duranton and Overman (2005) (henceforth DO). Both
approaches measure industry agglomeration over and above the overall concentration of eco-
nomic activity and control for industrial concentration driven by firm-specific characteristics
such as the plant size distribution. Nevertheless, as the EG index is prone to a set of short-
comings (see Koh and Riedel (2009) for a detailed discussion), we use the DO approach in
the main analysis to identify localized four-digit industries. Robustness checks using the EG
index are discussed in Section 5.
In the following, we briefly outline the DO-methodology, for a detailed description of the
approach see Duranton and Overman (2005) and Koh and Riedel (2009). The basic intu-
ition for the DO index is to estimate the density of bilateral distances between firms of the
same industry and to compare the distribution of bilateral distances to the distribution of
a hypothetical industry’s randomly generated location pattern which has the same number
of firms as the actual industry. An industry is considered as being localized at distance d
if its distribution of bilateral distances departs significantly from randomness. In the first
step, we calculate the bilateral distances of firms within each industry m using Gauss-Kru¨ger
coordinates available for each municipality. Defining di,j as the distance between firm i and
j of industry m, we estimate the density of distances Kˆm(d) at any distance d with
Kˆm(d) =
1
n(n− 1)h
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
f
(
d− di,j
h
)
(A.1)
where n is the number of firms in industry m, f is the Gaussian kernel function with band-
width (smoothing parameter) h. Next, we calculate counterfactual kernel density estimates
for this industry by randomly drawing locations from the population of German firms. Re-
peating this simulation exercise 1000 times, we then compare the industry’s actual location
pattern to the simulated patterns and thus determine whether it significantly departs from
randomness. To test the significance of the result, we construct local confidence bands which
allow us to make statements about whether the location pattern of an industry deviates sig-
nificantly from randomness at a certain distance. For our analysis, it is decisive whether firms
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are significantly localized within communities, which corresponds to significant localization
at a distance of 0 kilometers with our approach (as our data does not allow us to identify
the precise firm location within a community, the distance between firms located in the same
community is set to 0, see Koh and Riedel (2009)). We hence follow DO and rank the sim-
ulated kernel density estimates K˜m at the distance of 0 kilometers in ascending order and
select the 5th and 95th percentile. This yields a K˜m which represents an upper 5% bound
and a K˜m which represents the lower 5% bound. An industry m is said to be localized at
distance 0 if Kˆm > K˜m and the index of localization is defined as
DOm ≡ max(Kˆm − K˜m, 0). (A.2)
The size of the index indicates how much localization occurs at a certain distance. It will
serve as a proxy for the intensity of an industry’s agglomeration in our analysis.
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Appendix B: Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables: Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Local Business Tax Rate 60,646 16.571 1.600 0 25
Own Agglomeration Measures
Employees (Uoi,t) 60,646 2,950.445 18,818.81 1 774,869
Log Employees (log Uoi,t) 60,646 5.900 2.040 0 13.560
Localized Employees (Lo1i,t) 60,646 576.649 6,656.624 0 305,731
Log Localized Employees (log Lo1i,t) 60,646 1.527 2.711 0 12.630
Log (Localized Employees × DO) (log Lo2i,t) 60,646 .133 .468 0 6.456
Relative Agglomeration Measures
Log Relative Employees? (log Uri,t) 60,646 11.595 .873 -1.325 17.671
Log Relative Localized Employees? (log Lri,t) 37,551 8.907 .688 -.794 15.678
Control Variables
Log Income per Capita, Lag 53,972 9.732 .100 9.460 10.238
Dist.Weighted Avg. Neighbor Tax Rate, Lag 53,980 13.753 .942 11.984 15.565
Administration Grants pCN, Lag 28,989 198.391 128.461 -67.357 5,197.538
Investment Grants pCN, Lag 28,989 73.991 159.290 -201.363 9,110.726
Deficit pCN, Lag 28,989 19.829 3,691.076 -574,608 195,236.1
Highway Access 60,646 .151 .592 0 21
Number of Railway Stations 60,646 .553 .955 0 16
Number of Airports 60,646 .050 .227 0 2
Number of Seaports 60,646 .023 .184 0 7
Rural Community 60,646 .810 .392 0 1
Border Community 60,646 .022 .171 0 1
State Capital 60,646 .001 .038 0 1
Population Share Aged > 65, Lag 33,769 .174 .041 0 .423
Population Share Aged < 14, Lag 33,769 .166 .033 0 .317
Unemployment Rate, Lag 33,614 .034 .013 0 .485
Instrumental Variables
Population 1910 58,764 4,566.351 28,294.310 11 1,345,142
Log Population 1910 58,764 7.285 1.212 2.398 14.112
Log Population Density 1910 58,710 4.229 .773 -.846 8.007
Log Market Potential 1910? 58,764 12.116 .228 11.438 12.996
Log Rel. Population Share 1910? 58,764 .001 .035 -.007 1.6142
Train Connections 1935 56,841 .413 1.922 0 77
Log Train Connections 1935 56,841 .169 .449 0 4.358
Log Train Connections Neighbors 1935? 56,841 2.863 .275 2.122 3.882
Notes: N in Euros; ? normalized on distance;  The unemployment rate is calculated as the number of unemployed
over the community’s number of inhabitants. (Log) Employees stands for the (logarithm of the) number of employees
in a municipality, (Log) Localized Employees for the (logarithm of the) number of employees in localized industries, as
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determined based on Duranton and Overman (2005), (Log) (Localized Employees × DO) is the logarithm of an index
constructed as the number of employees in a localized industry times the DO index which accounts for the intensity
of the industry’s localization pattern, summed up over all localized industries located in a community. Log Relative
Employees is the logarithm of an index capturing the community’s number of employees compared to neighboring
communities, normalized on distance (plus a constant which ensures that the index takes on positive values before taking
the logarithm). Log Relative Localized Employees is the logarithm of an index capturing the community’s number of
employees in a certain localized industry compared to neighboring communities, normalized on distance and summed
up over all localized industries (plus a constant which ensures that the index takes on positive values before taking the
logarithm). In brackets behind the agglomeration measures, we include the variable names referring to the construction
of the variables in Section 3.2. Log Income per Capita, Lag is the first lag of the average net income of a community’s
inhabitants, Dist.Weighted Avg. Neighbor Tax Rate, Lag is the first lag of the distance-weighted average local business
tax rate in neighboring communities, Administration Grants pC, Lag is the first lag of the administration grants
received by the community per capita, Investment Grants pC, Lag is the first lag of the investment grants received
by the community per capita, Deficit pC, Lag is the first lag of the community’s deficit per capita, Highway Access
is the number of accesses to the highway network in the community, Number of Railway Stations is the number of
railway stations in the community, Number of Airports is the number of airports in the community, Number of Seaports
is the number of seaports in a community, Rural Community is a dummy variable indicating rural communities with
less than 7500 inhabitants, Border Community indicates communities located at the national border, State Capital
indicates communities which are the capital of a German state, Population Share Aged > 65, Lag is the first lag of
the share of the community population which is aged 65 or older, Population Share Aged < 14, Lag is the first lag of
the fraction of the community population which is aged 14 or younger, Unemployment Rate, Lag is the first lag of the
unemployment rate, (Log) Population 1910 is (the logarithm of) the community’s long-lagged number of inhabitants
in 1910, (Log) Population Density 1910 is (the logarithm of) the community’s long-lagged population density in 1910,
(Log) Market Potential 1910 is (the logarithm of) the market access of a community in 1910 as captured by the sum
of the population in neighboring communities normalized on distance, (Log) Relative Population Share 1910 is (the
logarithm of) an index capturing a community’s relative population share compared to neighboring municipalities,
normalized on distance. (Log) Train Connections 1935 is (the logarithm of) the number of train connections which
run through a community in 1935, (Log) Train Connections Neighbors 1935 is (the logarithm of) the number of train
connections which run through neighboring communities in 1935, normalized on distance. A detailed description of the
variable construction can be found in the main text.
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Table 2: Localized Four-digit Industries with DO>Mean
Four-digit Code∗ Name of Industry
1520 Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and mollusca
1594 Manufacture of cider and other fruit wines
1715 Preparation and spinning of textile fibres
1721-24 Weaving of cotton and carded and silk yarn
1760 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics
2211 Publishing of sound recordings and books
2213 Publishing of magazines
2461 Manufacture of explosives
2613 Manufacture of hollow glass
2731-34 Cold drawing of bars, wire and cold rolling of narrow strip
2752 Casting of steel
2840 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll-forming of metal; powder metallurgy
2861-62 Manufacture of cutlery and tools
2874 Manufacture of fasteners and screw machine products
3350 Manufacture of watches and clocks
3511 Building of ships and floating structures
3622,3661 Jewelery and related articles
4532 Other construction installation
6022 Urban passenger land, sea and coastal water and air transport
6323 Service activities incidental to water and air transportation
6523,6602 Other financial intermediation and pension funding
6711-12 Administration of financial markets; security and commodity contracts brokerage
7020 Renting and operating of own or leased real estate
7031-32 Management of real estate on a fee or contract basis
7320 Research and experimental development on social sciences and humanities
7413-14 Market research and public opinion polling, consultancy activities
7440 Advertising
9211-12 Motion picture, video and television programme activities
9232 Operation of arts facilities
9240 News agency activities
∗ The 4-digit industry classification follows the German code “Klassifikation der Wirtschaftszweige WZ(93)”.
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Table 4B: First Stage to the Own Agglomeration Regressions
# Loc. Empl.∗DO # All Employees
(Localization, log Lo2it ) (Urbanization, log U
o
it)
(1) (2)
Log Population Density 1910 .028∗∗ .507∗∗∗
(.013) (.051)
Log Market Potential Pop 1910 .322∗∗ 1.207∗∗
(.156) (.549)
Log Rel. Population 1910 10.385∗∗∗ 3.838∗
(1.141) (2.038)
Log Train Connections 1935 .067∗∗∗ .300∗∗∗
(.023) (.038)
Log Train Connections Neigh. 1935 .132∗∗ .124
(.051) (.188)
# Observations 20,373 20,373
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000
Partial R-Squared of Excl. IVs 0.2110 0.1078
Notes:
Table 4B depict the first stage regression to the specification shown in Column (11) of Table 4A. The dependent
variable in the first (second) column is the localization measure log Lo2it (the urbanization measure log U
o
it) as
defined in Section 3.2.
Table 5B: First Stage to the Relative Agglomeration Regressions
# Rel. Loc. Employees # Rel. Employees
(Localization, log Lrit) (Urbanization, log U
r
it)
(1) (2)
Log Population 1910 .085∗∗∗ .369∗∗∗
(.015) (.014)
Log Population Density 1910 .049∗∗∗ -.021
(.016) (.016)
Log Market Potential 1910 .616∗∗∗ .236∗
(.148) (.126)
Log Rel. Population 1910 10.535∗∗∗ 5.032∗∗∗
(1.221) (1.003)
Log Train Connections 1935 .087∗∗∗ .114∗∗∗
(.027) (.020)
Log Train Connections Neigh. 1935 .013∗∗∗ .007∗∗
(.004) (.003)
# Observations 14,999 14,999
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000
Partial R-Squared of Excl. IVs 0.1710 0.3124
Notes:
Table 5B depict the first stage regression to the specification shown in Column (9) of Table 5A. The dependent
variable in the first (second) column is the relative localization measure log Lrit (the urbanization measure log
Urit) as defined in Section 3.2.
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Table 6: Robustness Checks
Dep. Variable: Local Business Tax Rate
Own Aggl. Rel. Aggl. Market Potential and Diversity
Expl. Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Localization Measure .123∗∗∗ .452∗∗∗ .355∗∗∗ .155∗ .280∗∗∗ .564∗∗∗ .304∗∗∗ .556∗∗
(.035) (.126) (.077) (.085) (.062) (.160) (.063) (.225)
Urbanization Measure (log Uoit) .076
∗∗∗ .176∗∗ .571∗∗∗ .447∗∗∗ .066∗∗∗ .198∗∗∗ .050∗∗ .220
(.021) (.082) (.058) (.082) (.020) (.075) (.020) (.445)
Log Market Potential .067 -.012
(.383) (.508)
Diversification .069∗∗∗ -.050
(.023) (1.016)
Log Income per Capita, Lag -.130 -.508 -1.144 -.179 -.623 -.191 -.635
(.639) (.714) (1.146) (.669) (.713) (.653) (.685)
Avg. Tax Neighbor, Lag .232 .677 .361 .934∗∗ .245 .710 .247 .709
(.238) (.422) (.222) (.429) (.241) (.484) (.235) (.456)
Deficit/103, Lag .011∗∗∗ .011∗∗∗ .220∗∗∗ .011∗∗∗ .012∗∗∗ .011∗∗∗ .012∗∗∗
(.001) (.001) (.108) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Administration Grants/103, Lag 1.213∗∗∗ 1.556∗∗∗ 2.550∗∗∗ 1.181∗∗∗ 1.552∗∗∗ 1.135∗∗∗ 1.620
(.218) (.389) (.459) (.213) (.375) (.197) (1.281)
Investment Grants/103, Lag -.072 -.121 .138 -.068 -.117 -.051 -.133
(.063) (.090) (.355) (.060) (.089) (.060) (.326)
Share Population > 65, Lag 1.266∗∗ .491 -5.403∗∗ 1.332∗∗ .369 1.327∗∗ .298
(.530) (.800) (2.717) (.519) (.739) (.532) (1.443)
Share Population < 14, Lag -1.710∗∗ -1.615∗ -7.185∗ -1.596∗∗ -1.692∗∗ -1.723∗∗ -1.596
(.749) (.848) (3.830) (.737) (.830) (.738) (2.328)
Unemployment Rate, Lag 6.879∗∗∗ -.468 5.862 6.495∗∗∗ -.083 6.190∗∗∗ -.190
(2.157) (3.416) (6.862) (2.161) (3.046) (2.220) (3.067)
First Nature Geographies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Community Type
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Infrastructure Var.
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Localization Measure Used (log) Lo3it L
o3
it L
r2
it L
r2
it L
o2
it L
o2
it L
o2
it L
o2
it
# Observations 28,204 20,373 4,228 2,493 28,204 20,373 28,204 20,373
# Commuting Areas 6,042 5,455 685 618 6,042 5,455 6,042 5,455
Adj. R-squared 0.6425 – 0.6934 0.7875 0.6453 – 0.6460 –
Stock Yogo 13.425 18.256 1.279
Sargan Hansen, p-value (dof) 0.9403(3) 0.7270(2) 0.7249(2)
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for commuting area clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are German municipalities per year, the dependent
variable is the municipalities’ local business tax rate. The urbanization measure is the number of employees (log
Uoit). The localization measure in Columns (1) and (2) is log L
o3
it . In Specifications (3)-(4) the localization measure
is the community’s average distance to other municipalities which hold an industry center of the same localized
industry, summed up over all localized industries (log Lr2it ). Specifications (5)-(8) reestimate Specifications (8)
and (11) of Table 4A, additionally including control variables for the consumer market access and industry
diversification. In Specifications (5)-(6), Log Market Potential is the logarithm of the sum of the overall net
income of all neighboring communities, normalized on distance, and hence measures a location’s market access
(see Head and Mayer (2004)). In Specifications (7)-(8), Diversification denotes the inverse Hirschman-Herfindahl
index and measures the degree of diversification within a municipality (see also Duranton and Puga (2000)).
It is defined as the inverse of a municipality’s sum of the squared industry employment shares, where a higher
index therefore indicates a more diversified municipality. For a detailed description of the control variables, see
Section 3.3 or the notes to Table 1. Additionally to the control variables depicted in the table, all regressions
include a full set of year and commuting area fixed effects.
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